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Editorial Abstract: The Defense Department 
is transforming information-technology 
systems into a Global Information Grid 
(GIG) that will connect sensors to weap­
ons systems and provide unprecedented 
situational awareness. The authors sug­
gest that if not properly implemented, the 
GIG may overwhelm war fighters with 
information presented at the wrong time, 
at the wrong level of detail, and without 
proper analysis. This article proposes a 
model to direct the flow of information in 
the GIG. 
TheDeparTmenTofDefense(DOD) is in the midst of transforming its vast collection of information-technology systems intoan interconnectedGlobal 
Information Grid (GIG), which will ultimately 
connect sensors to weapons systems, enable 
personnel to share information at will, and 
provide unprecedented levels of situational 
awareness to commanders at all levels. how­
ever, if we do not implement the GIG with a 
proper level of restriction on the flow of infor­
mation, war fighters risk being overwhelmed 
not only by too much information but also by 
information presented at the wrong time, at 
the wrong level of detail, and without proper 
analysis and interpretation. This article pro­
poses a model to prevent this situation by di­
recting the flow of information based on its 
classification level, integrity, and relevance to 
the end user. 
The Global Information Grid 
In response to increasing difficulties associ­
ated with sharing information between vari­
ous platforms and information systems operat­
ing in the joint environment, the DOD created 
the concept of the GIG.1 DOD policy defines 
this grid as “a globally interconnected, end-to­
end set of information capabilities, associated 
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processes, and personnel for collecting, pro­
cessing, storing, disseminating and managing 
information on demand to warfighters, policy 
makers, and support personnel.”2 established 
GIG policies also implement key components 
of the Clinger-Cohen Information Technology 
management reform act of 1996, including 
information security, revised acquisition strate­
gies, and best practices for handling data at all 
levels of the DOD.3 although many of the ef­
forts in developing the GIG might simply en­
tail the application of the DOD’s best practices 
in acquisitions to the still-maturing field of in­
formation technology, the goal of achieving 
information superiority remains paramount— 
the primary objective of the overall GIG effort. 
Connecting personnel and equipment with 
advanced information-sharing tools will likely 
revolutionize our capabilities, but we must 
carefully manage the quality and volume of 
information presented to the war fighters of 
tomorrow. 
The Sand Table 
For centuries, military commanders have 
used various models to understand the battle-
space. In the seventeenth century, campaign 
planners used intricate, craftsmen-built scale 
models of fortifications to analyze points of 
vulnerability and routes of attack.4 In the field, 
leaders have long used sticks and stones in the 
sand to rehearse maneuvers and depict unit 
locations and terrain. aircraft and antiaircraft 
technology increased the complexity of the 
“sand table” by adding important air compo­
nents to the planning process. new technology 
used in Operation Desert Storm provided 
commanders and bomb-damage analysts a live 
view from the cockpit and, in many cases, from 
the weapons themselves as they flew into tar­
gets. Today, command centers of all levels are 
equipped with large data walls, on which in­
teresting computer or video feeds provide a 
constant flow of data. Live video from re­
motely piloted predator aircraft feeds into air 
and space operations centers, giving com­
manders and intelligence analysts what some 
people call “predator Crack” or “Kill TV” be­
cause of the display’s ability to divert viewers’ 
full attention away from their primary duties.5 
The frequently asked question concerning 
what shows on the displays and who has re­
sponsibility for the content raises an even 
broader and more important question about 
the future GIG-enabled command center: how 
will we manage all of the data available on all 
of the interconnected platforms? 
although the GIG’s influence on the devel­
opment and acquisition of weapons systems is 
evident in requirements for common data 
standards and supported communications pro­
tocols, the military services are actively devel­
oping ways to inject network technology every­
where. army projects such as Future Force 
Warrior will provide each soldier with a com­
plex array of networked information sensors 
and displays, reminiscent of the gear worn by 
the futuristic space marines in the science-
fiction movie Aliens.6 One scene in that movie 
depicts a frighteningly realistic scenario in 
which the team commander watches health 
monitors go silent as each member falls and 
the confusion of battle grinds his decision-
making ability to a halt. Several years later, 
real commanders orbiting in Black hawk heli­
copters over Somalia tried to command a res­
cue convoy through a decaying urban environ­
ment. The communications delay between the 
airborne command post and the trucks intro­
duced chaos significant enough to confuse the 
convoy, effectively driving it into a dead end.7 
Future systems must be able to create a timely 
flow of critical information in both directions, 
and we need to establish processes to help us 
manage and respond to that flow effectively. 
Because of the rapidly increasing volume of 
available information, numerous research proj­
ects now under way seek to design virtual envi­
ronments that integrate, analyze, and display 
every piece of information in an immersive, 
four-dimensional battlespace, where mission 
planners and commanders can manipulate 
time and perspective to suit their needs.8 One 
can easily imagine the demands placed on 
commanders trying to conduct a war from in­
side a virtual, real-time sand table with data 
from thousands of sources pouring in at in­
credible rates. additionally, the GIG notion­
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ally gives personnel anywhere in the battle-
space the ability to have similar representations 
streamed to their locations by various means. 
an obvious hazard of this capability—beyond 
information overload—is the danger of com­
manders making tactical decisions based on 
data intended for a strategic perspective and 
war fighters on the ground adjusting their tac­
tics based on information intended only for 
strategic planners. 
The Problem of Inverted 

Perspectives

as prescribed in joint doctrine, planners 
design operations to follow the principles of 
war, which include surprise, simplicity, security, 
and unity of command.9 numerous historical 
examples illustrate how friendly or hostile knowl­
edge of certain components of plans drasti­
cally altered the results of those plans. Still 
others demonstrate that reaction or failure to 
respond to evolving circumstances has a dras­
tic impact on the operation and effectiveness 
of the leadership involved. rather than ex­
plore the success and failure of operations 
with respect to the principles of war, we should 
consider the implications of operating a GIG-
enhanced command center of the future. 
For example, a suite of sensors programmed 
to detect personnel and vehicle movement 
could collect and report status for display on a 
command center’s data wall, indicating ma­
neuver by an unknown unit. If we can attribute 
this maneuver to a friendly special-operations 
mission planned and executed in secrecy, we 
should restrict access to this sensor data at the 
same classification level of the mission and 
not automatically display it on a data wall for 
viewing by personnel without an appropriate 
clearance. Conversely, if a similar sensor suite 
detected the footsteps of an individual in a re­
stricted area, we should present the data col­
lected by this sensor (probably not displayed 
on the same data wall) only to appropriate se­
curity personnel. Commanders directing their 
attention to an unprocessed data point like 
this could experience an inverted perspective, 
whereby a single piece of potentially irrelevant 
data diverts focus from the broader picture. 
Similar scenarios could illustrate how a tactical 
unit on the ground might see data intended 
only for a strategic view; any changes to the 
actions of that tactical unit might eliminate a 
key component of a strategic plan. We assert 
that such an inverted perspective constitutes a 
very real hazard of information that might ex­
ist in a GIG-enhanced battlefield. 
In an ideal environment, we would deploy 
thousands if not millions of sensors across the 
battlespace to collect climate, audio, video, 
and electromagnetic signal data. additionally, 
airborne command and control (C2) assets 
would compose an integrated picture of the 
battlespace. Current processes and tools such 
as air tasking orders help deconflict the air­
space, but some operations conducted on the 
ground or at sea might not be coordinated 
with all components. a robust sensor net would 
provide a bridge between these dissimilar 
components of the battlespace to help pre­
vent incidents of friendly fire, but the compos­
ite picture would likely not have relevance to 
some war fighters. In total, the amount of in­
formation collected will be immense, and the 
details of the battlespace available for display 
will prove tempting to war fighters and leaders 
at all levels. GIG-enhanced aircraft will have 
access to a vast store of information. however, 
with this comes the possibility that unprocessed 
sensor data might make its way into the cock­
pit, forcing pilots with increased sensitivity to 
collateral damage and escalation to change 
tactics, select alternate targets, or abort the 
engagement. 
Ground units would need time to analyze 
the data from sensors detecting a nearby fire-
fight before determining the location of units 
in the area and perhaps requesting additional 
airborne or spaceborne surveillance. Those 
units not aware of friendly forces in covert op­
erations could alter their tactics or maneuver 
in response to indications of a nearby fire-
fight—particularly if sensors indicated activity 
in a unit’s area of responsibility. hopefully, all 
parties in that area would have already re­
ceived briefings on operations to an appropri­
ate level of detail, but any GIG-enhanced ca­
pabilities for examining additional sensor data 
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could affect the commander on the ground in 
a number of ways—hence the need for clear 
rules for using this data in order to avoid in­
verted perspectives. 
One could present any number of examples 
demonstrating avoidance of inverted perspec­
tives by limiting exposure of data in the GIG, 
and still more examples could illustrate that 
any restrictions on information flow could re­
duce flexibility. Considering both sides of this 
argument, we assert that we should place lim­
its on the places that automatically receive data 
as well as on the people authorized to access 
it. We must also consider that some plat­
forms—as William T. hobbins, a lieutenant 
general at the time, indicated during an inter­
view with Airman Magazine—will produce data 
at different rates while operators in varying 
roles will consume data feeds at different rates, 
thus adding more considerations for a poten­
tial solution.10 Clearly, this paints an amazingly 
complex picture with fuzzy and continuously 
evolving operational requirements. 
Current Management of 

Information Flow

We are all familiar with the classification 
levels defined by the national Security agency. 
Only users holding a secret or higher clear­
ance and having a need to know can read data 
protected by a secret classification level. Simi­
larly, readers with a high classification level 
can normally read any material at or below 
that level, assuming they have a need to know. 
In a conceptual, GIG-enabled virtual com­
mand center, we could classify information 
specific to a sensitive operation at a sufficiently 
high level to prevent those who hold lower-
level classifications from reading the data. 
Furthermore, we could reserve display of data 
relevant to those classified operations for indi­
viduals with the required need to know. addi­
tionally, we must assure that data on a com­
mand center’s displays remains at the lowest 
clearance level of personnel with access to 
those displays. 
Using a well-disciplined approach, we could 
properly secure or sanitize data from all 
sources to prevent users from seeing informa­
tion not cleared for their consumption. Thus 
far, however, we have addressed only the 
proper treatment of data with respect to con­
fidentiality. The integrity or trustworthiness of 
the data is also of prime importance, particu­
larly in urban areas, where we have a great 
need for very accurate and timely data and, 
therefore, a need to evaluate raw data rapidly 
and prepare it for presentation to leadership. 
normal data-classification techniques do not 
classify information based on its integrity, so we 
need to explore a method to help categorize 
data that could cause an inverted-perspective 
hazard in a GIG-enhanced picture of the 
battlefield, whether it is unprocessed remote-
sensor data or imagery not yet evaluated by 
intelligence personnel. 
Biba’s Integrity Model 
While working on an air Force computer-
security research project in 1977, K. J. Biba 
wrote what has since become the seminal pa­
per on information integrity.11 In it, he exam­
ined a method for maintaining the validity of 
data on information-processing systems, choos­
ing to use the concept of integrity as a measure 
of information’s validity. That is, information 
from a known, trustworthy source would have 
high integrity, while information based on ru­
mor or from unknown sources would have low 
integrity. Similarly, password-protected infor­
mation stored in electronic form would have 
higher integrity than data available for read­
ing or editing without any access controls at 
all. If we extrapolated this concept for applica­
tion to our GIG-enhanced command center, 
the integrity of the reader—that is, the read­
er’s response to data—is influenced by the in­
formation consumed. new and startling infor­
mation will affect the reader’s behavior to 
varying degrees, based on the integrity of the 
source of that data. For example, a commander 
might decide to take some risks after reading 
information from a reliable source but not do 
so in reaction to the same information from 
an unreliable source. Similarly, one should not 
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interpret a report that included a data point 
from a low-integrity source as factual. 
In the strict formulation of Biba’s integrity 
model, three rules apply to reading, writing, 
or acting upon information from sources of 
various integrity levels. This model refers to 
things that can create and consume data as 
subjects and to products produced as objects. 
The rules rely on the notion of dominance, 
which implies some sort of permission granted 
to the dominant over the subordinate, whether 
that permission involves reading, accessing, or 
in some way modifying something. Using se­
curity clearances to demonstrate dominance, 
Biba shows that one object dominates another 
when its security clearance level is the same as 
or higher than that of the other object. For 
example, a secret clearance dominates secret 
or unclassified clearances, while top secret 
dominates top secret, secret, and unclassified 
clearance levels. When a subject dominates an 
object, the subject can read the object. If the 
subject does not dominate the object, the sub­
ject cannot read the object, just as someone 
with a secret clearance cannot read a top-secret 
document but can read secret or unclassified 
documents. Biba uses the concept of integrity 
and the rule of dominance to determine ac­
cess controls in his computer-security re­
search. The three integrity-preserving rules 
from Biba’s integrity model are as follows: 
1. a subject can read an object if and only if 
the object’s integrity level dominates (is 
greater than or equal to) the subject’s in­
tegrity level. That is, a subject can only 
read objects with equal or higher integrity. 
2. a subject can write data into an object if 
and only if the subject’s integrity level 
dominates the object’s integrity level. 
Since the subject must have integrity at 
least as high as the object, the object’s 
integrity is preserved. 
3. a subject can execute (or direct the ac­
tion of) another subject if and only if 
the first subject’s integrity level domi­
nates the second subject’s integrity level. 
Someone of lower integrity cannot oper­
ate on someone else’s behalf.12 
In plain terms, rule one means that a sub­
ject can read an object only if the data will not 
have a deceptive or misleading effect on the 
reader. In our command center, we would not 
normally present data (an object) to the com­
mander (a subject) unless the data had under­
gone proper vetting using prudent processes. 
rule two means that some data source of a 
lower integrity level can’t inject information 
that one might interpret as accurate or valid. 
again using our command center example, 
we would not display raw data on the data wall 
until we have validated it, much like we would 
not present the actions of a unit to the com­
mander as confirmed results until we have 
conducted proper battle damage assessment 
or a mission debriefing. rule three would pre­
vent unnecessary reaction to deceptive acts or 
preprocessed data from sensors, which could 
prove useful in avoiding inverted perspectives. 
Together, these rules address some of the 
concerns we have explored so far with respect 
to unprocessed sensor data. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable that application of the Biba integ­
rity model to a notional command center can 
form the basis of a system implemented to help 
prevent inverted perspectives. This model 
could assist in defining specific requirements 
for automatically filtering information and 
controlling access, but commander flexibility 
and the ability to share information would ex­
perience necessary limitations to some de­
gree. Joint doctrine emphasizes information 
dissemination as a key component of intelli­
gence support: “Intelligence will play a critical 
and continuous role in supporting warfight­
ing. advances in computer processing, precise 
global positioning, and telecommunications 
will provide joint force commanders . . . with 
the capability to determine accurate locations 
of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to col­
lect, process, and disseminate relevant data to 
thousands of locations.”13 
a key point entails the use of the word rele­
vant to describe the dissemination of data. 
Further discussion in doctrine defines this term 
as a key attribute of intelligence that describes 
the scope of intelligence gathering and sharing 
efforts; moreover, it delineates who needs spe­
cific pieces of information and, more impor­
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tantly, who shouldn’t be distracted by irrele­
vant data.14 Therefore, a model that combines 
the DOD’s traditional classification levels with 
data integrity and relevance holds the key to 
formulating policy for data-sharing mechanisms 
developed for future command centers. 
Classification, Integrity, 
and Relevance 
The war fighter’s need for relevant and ac­
curate information is thoroughly understood 
and well defined in doctrine and operational 
art, but defining the scope, sources, and for­
mat of the data would require continuously 
updating vast amounts of information. efforts 
to build systems that provide data in predefined 
formats or follow predefined message-sharing 
rules normally result in products difficult to 
integrate or expensive to update. To avoid the 
problems of updating systems to keep pace 
with continually evolving technologies, we pro­
pose to control information flow using a data-
sharing mechanism based on classification, 
integrity, and relevance. The following sum­
marizes our definitions so far: 
•	 classification : a rating assigned to infor­
mation in order to provide appropriate 
protection and restrict access 
•	 integrity : a measure of a subject’s or ob­
ject’s trustworthiness 
•	 relevance : a measure of applicability to a 
purpose or a customer 
•	 dominance : the condition in effect when 
one entity has the same or higher rating 
as another 
Our information-sharing mechanism must 
enable meaningful and adaptive information-
sharing capabilities within a command center. 
Consider such a center staffed with personnel 
of varying clearances and areas of functional 
expertise, similar to other command centers 
such as wing command posts, expeditionary 
operations centers, or air and space operations 
centers. as in Biba’s model, both personnel 
and systems can create and consume data and 
are referred to as subjects, while the docu­
ments or virtual products produced are re­
ferred to as objects. Our information-sharing 
mechanism assigns three ratings to every sub­
ject and object: classification, relevance, and 
integrity. 
Suppose the classification levels for subjects 
and objects are unclassified, for official use only, 
secret, or top secret. For simplicity’s sake, our 
model will not address clearance caveats or 
clearances for personnel from other countries, 
but we could readily incorporate them. The 
relevance and integrity levels of subjects and 
objects will be low, medium, or high. personnel­
classification levels normally do not change over 
time, but personnel can induce and experi­
ence changes in integrity levels and will pro­
duce objects of varying relevance levels. Simi­
larly, documents and processing systems often 
have the same ratings as their content or inputs. 
For our command center, we propose the fol­
lowing rules, which govern all information-
sharing transactions and which we enumerate 
below prior to discussing their implications in 
the next section: 
1. a subject can read or process an object 
if and only if the subject’s classification 
level dominates the object’s classifica­
tion level. 
2. Initially, all trusted subjects have a high 
integrity rating, and all subjects and ob­
jects are assigned appropriate classifica­
tion ratings. all untrusted subjects have 
a low integrity rating. 
3. The integrity level of a subject or object can 
be raised only through a well-controlled 
process. 
4. When a subject creates an object, the 
created object will have an integrity level 
equal to the subject that created it, or if 
the newly created object contains infor­
mation from other subjects or objects, 
in full or in part, the new object will have 
the lowest integrity level of the compo­
nent information. 
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5. The relevance level of a subject or object 
is determined through another well-
controlled process. 
6. If a subject reads an object of a lower in­
tegrity level, the subject’s integrity level 
will take on the object’s lower integrity 
level. The subject can return to its previ­
ous integrity level only in accordance 
with the process defined in rule three. 
7. a subject can process and then manually 
or automatically forward an object to an­
other subject only if the forwarded ob­
ject dominates the receiving subject’s 
integrity and relevance levels and if the 
receiving subject’s classification level 
dominates the object’s classification.15 
Rule Analysis and Clarification 
rule one ensures observation of the funda­
mental requirements of need to know, secu­
rity, and proper access-control mechanisms. 
rule two ensures that personnel and 
information-processing systems can share in­
formation following our basic rules. Trusted 
subjects include sources trusted in a wide con­
text, whether that involves coalition partners; 
our own personnel- and information-processing 
systems and equipment; and intelligence, sur­
veillance, and reconnaissance resources. Un­
trusted subjects include those systems and 
personnel not under the command center’s 
control, possibly including subjects such as 
the domestic and international media, infor­
mants, or any source of questionable origin. 
rule three dictates establishment of a for­
mal process to change the integrity level of a 
subject or object. The intelligence community 
uses similar procedures to mark the level of 
trust in an intelligence resource; multiple 
sources of lower integrity levels could provide 
enough corroboration to support raising the 
integrity level of a subject or object, but the 
process of doing so should be well understood 
and performed by a designated entity. This 
process will obviously represent one of the 
most important components of this model 
since improperly raising integrity levels of a 
poor information source could compromise 
the entire scheme. 
rule four requires that personnel or sys­
tems creating information attribute the source 
accordingly and properly mark data at the ap­
propriate integrity level. Doing so will ensure 
that a receiver places the suitable level of trust 
or skepticism on the information. new infor­
mation compiled from multiple sources will 
not automatically assume the integrity level of 
the subject compiling the information; in­
stead, the integrity level of the new object will 
reflect the lowest such level of the compiled 
information until application of the process 
defined in rule three. 
The process suggested by rule five can be 
more flexible than that in rule three, depend­
ing on the role of the receiving subject. For 
example, a tactical ground unit would have a 
much smaller “sphere of relevance” than 
would a C2 aircraft orbiting over an area of 
responsibility. The ground unit would typi­
cally be interested in information about an 
opponent’s nearby ground forces, in-range ar­
tillery units, or status of aircraft flying close air 
support, but not in mission tracks of long-
range friendly aircraft, threats from enemy air 
defenses, or air-refueling tracks. however, the 
C2 aircraft might want to display locations of 
friendly ground forces in the area of a specific 
operation. Some process must define an ap­
propriate sphere of relevance for each subject, 
based on mission needs. at the operational 
level, each subject should also be able to cus­
tomize its sphere of relevance to assure the ad­
dition of data of interest or the removal of in­
formation deemed no longer pertinent. 
rule six prohibits the forwarding of any 
low-integrity information as higher-integrity 
information without proper analysis and con­
sideration. Similarly, personnel who read low-
integrity information must be careful not to 
make decisions or pass on the information 
without putting it into proper context. This 
particular rule is more difficult to implement 
for personnel than for data-processing equip­
ment. For example, one could interpret a sys­
tem’s report of erratic and illogical readings 
from a sensor as a malfunction; additionally, 
one could include the appropriate caveats 
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with low-integrity data added to a report. how­
ever, when the subject is a person rather than 
an automated system, preventing him or her 
from acting on or up-channeling information 
without regard for its lower integrity will pres­
ent a problem. 
rule seven ensures the proper filtering of 
information in accordance with integrity and 
relevance rules. a tactical display is useless if it 
exhibits irrelevant or misleading information 
at the wrong time, and unprocessed or incom­
plete data could cause premature or incorrect 
decisions. The final caveat guarantees that 
sensitive operations are not compromised— 
data must undergo sanitizing or proper de­
classification before transmission to subjects 
not involved in the operation. In effect, this 
rule provides the “push and pull”—prevent­
ing information overload from unneeded au­
tomated pushes while preserving flexibility 
for pulling useful data. 
Back in the Command Center 
In order to implement these rules in a com­
mand center, we need to completely automate 
some processes, let personnel in various ca­
reer fields or leadership positions handle the 
others exclusively, and see that both systems 
and personnel implement several rules. after 
the transfer of objects to paper form, tradi­
tional processes such as classification controls 
and need-to-know restrictions become person­
nel responsibilities, while various mechanisms 
can restrict the flow of digital information. 
rules three and five, however, require humans 
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We stand ready to conduct a large-scale, long-duration ir­
regular warfare campaign as an integral part of the Joint 
Team, to include counterinsurgency, security, stability, tran­
sition and reconstruction operations. 
—2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement 
